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Abstract 
 
 For several centuries, women’s age at first marriage in Western Europe was higher 
than in the east (and in the rest of the world). Over the same period Western Europe 
began slow but sustained economic development relative to elsewhere. A model based 
on the economics of the household explains this association in two related ways. Both 
connect mortality, and the exercise of fertility restraint through higher marriage age, 
with greater human capital accumulation. The first explanation is simply an 
association but the second proposes a causal link where higher age of motherhood 
reduced the cost of investment in children. Evidence is provided that the causal 
process was operative in later nineteenth century Europe  
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The Western European Marriage Pattern and Economic Development∗  
 
A distinctive feature of the Western European family in the three or four centuries 
before the First World War was the late age at first marriage of women (Hajnal 1965). 
Even more apparent by the nineteenth century was Western Europe’s economic pre-
eminence (Landes 1998, Broadberry and Gupta 2006). The present paper explores the 
relationship between these two European characteristics. 
Physical capital in the pre-industrial world consisted largely of buildings. Not 
until the railway age of 1840s did physical capital impact substantially upon an 
economy (Feinstein and Pollard 1988). Instead early sustained economic growth is 
usually attributed to technological ingenuity (Von Tunzelman 2000 130). Ingenuity 
suggests a possible role for human capital as a source of innovation, and, in the 
absence of widespread schooling, there was a key role for the family in informal as 
well as formal education. 
The family, or more precisely family formation, also contributed to pre-industrial 
economic-demographic equilibrium. Balancing the size of the population against the 
productive potential of the economy was a vital means of maintaining living standards 
in pre-industrial economies (Wrigley and Schofield 1989 ch 11). T.R.Malthus (1830) 
observed that the ‘prudential restraint on marriage’ achieved such an equilibrium with 
a fixed agricultural area in the ‘Old World’, and was unnecessary amid the abundant 
land of the ‘New World’. The customary justification for ‘restraint’, later average 
female age at marriage and a higher proportion remaining unmarried, in western 
Europe was the need to accumulate or acquire sufficient resources to create a separate 
household for a married couple.  
Why the marriage custom emerged and what consequences flowed from it is 
illuminated by an economic theory of the family or household, particularly as 
concerns the production of human capital. Human capital is often judged critical to 
economic growth and development (Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992, Rebelo 1991, 
Sianesi and Van Reenen 2003). In a historical context a recent hypothesis has been 
that economic growth was triggered when technical progress changed so as to boost 
                                                 
∗ Over the unusually long gestation of this paper I have been helped by many people, some of whom I 
have now forgotten. But I do remember gratefully comments of  participants in seminars or 
conferences at Nuffield College Oxford, Carlos  III Madrid, Lund , Hebrew University Jerusalem, 
Cardiff, Strasbourg and Humboldt University Berlin and also those at the AEA meeting in New 
Orleans and a CEPR meeting in Krakow. Assistance from Giovanni Federico, Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura, Peter Lindert and Roger Clarke has been much appreciated, with the usual disclaimer. 
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the returns to education at the beginning of the industrial revolution (Galor and Weil 
2000). In the 1840s private returns to investment in male literacy were higher than 
those on alternative investments in Britain (Mitch 1984), consistent with such a shift 
in technical progress, or with a persistent market failure. An alternative hypothesis is 
that technical progress widened the gap between child and parental wages, 
encouraging more investment in children’s education and less child labour (Hazan 
and Berdugo 2002).  
Both hypotheses appeal to an exogenous technical change in the nineteenth 
century triggering investment in human capital. However there is evidence that 
European sustained and relatively heavy investment in education began earlier than 
the nineteenth century and was not exclusively commercially motivated (Reis 2005). 
Since the ‘great divergence’ between Western Europe and the rest of the world 
(Broadberry and Gupta 2006) also began earlier, the contribution of the household 
warrants consideration. 
One human capital hypothesis from household production theory is that 
economic development historically was triggered by increases in the relative ‘price of 
children’. This encouraged substitution by the family towards ‘child quality’, greater 
investment in human capital (Becker 1993)1. In the pre-industrial context, this shift in 
household demand would also require a reallocation of household time so as to 
increase household production of education and training broadly defined. More 
human capital accumulation then boosted economic growth.  
This paper contends instead that the evidence for later nineteenth century 
Europe at least- and probably for Western Europe from the fifteenth  and sixteenth 
centuries -  is that lower mortality required lower birth rates. These were achieved in 
part by later marriage. Later marriage raised the level of female education in a general 
sense, by providing time not entirely committed to child rearing. The lower time cost 
and general price of investing in ‘child quality’ of better informed mothers, stimulated 
sustained investment in human capital, which in turn eventually raised outputs and 
incomes.  
                                                 
1 ‘Even a modest tax on births can have a large negative effect on the number of children and a large 
positive effect on the amount spent on each child .’ (Becker 1993 p22). Becker Tamura and Murphy 
(1990) present another model that explains an inverse relationship between family size and human 
capital arising from increasing returns to human capital. The static formulation of the present paper 
does not require this increasing returns assumption.  
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Section 1 summarises the elements of the pertinent household production theory, 
pointing out the critical role of mortality to the ‘price of children’ and to the ‘price of 
child quality’. Section 2 discusses measurement and data issues. Sections 3, 4 and 5 
consider in turn empirical estimates of the three fundamental equations of the 
proposed explanation – birth rate, age at marriage and ‘child quality’. Section 3 
demonstrates that European fertility depended closely on death rates. Section 4 shows 
that at the beginning of the twentieth century age at marriage and proportion of 
women married in their twenties across European economies were highly correlated 
with fertility. Section 5 shows that lower human capital was strongly associated with 
earlier higher percentages of women married or female age at marriage, even when 
schooling is controlled. Section 6 estimates an aggregate production function and 
shows that human capital, as measured by literacy, was a substantial contributor to 
European incomes in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
1. Economic-demographic Equilibrium and Investment in Human Capital 
The western European marriage pattern, which emerged by the 16th century and 
persisted until at least the First World War, exhibited three principal features; an 
unusually late age of first marriage for females (around 25) , a low rate of illegitimate 
births ( two percent or less) and a high proportion of females never marrying (more 
than 10 percent) (Hajnal 1965). Marriage typically was associated with establishing a 
separate household- the formation of a new nuclear family.   
A Malthusian view of the function of the age at marriage is represented in 
figure 1. There is an equilibrium population N* when births are balanced by deaths at 
age of marriage a*. A good harvest or technical progress increased the demand for 
labour, bidding up wages. Births increased (to b1) with the rise in wages because 
higher wages allowed earlier marriage (from a* to a1), as well as encouraging more 
births from established couples. Along with lower death rates (m1), higher wages 
therefore disrupted the economic-demographic balance and population began growing 
(from N*). In due course the greater population became a larger work force that drove 
down the wage to the initial equilibrium, and the age at marriage rose accordingly. 
 Recent evidence on the long term working of the pre-industrial English  
economic demographic system (from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries) 
indicates that the positive check of mortality was minimal and the self-stabilising 
properties of the system were extremely weak (Lee and Anderson 2002; Nicolini 
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2007; Crafts and Mills 2009). A more plausible view of fertility than embedded in the 
Malthusian model is that the timing of family formation, the age at first marriage of 
 
Figure 1 A Malthusian Model of Age at Marriage 
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Age at 
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Marriage 
age=a(target births)
 
females, was related to the lifetime goals and constraints of the marriage partners. For 
present purposes the historical function of the family was to choose- subject to 
constraints- 
• numbers of children (n), (partly by age at marriage – alternatives included 
infanticide and abortion),   
• investment in them (education and health, drilling and skill acquisition) (q), 
even when the state begins substitute provision, 
• goods and services, such as food and clothes (by domestic production and by 
earning to purchase in markets) (z) 
The economics of the family or household postulates that individuals or couples trade 
off these three objectives against each other according to their perceived time and 
money costs and returns.  
In Becker’s (1981,1986) neoclassical model of the utility maximising family 
the net unit cost or ‘full price’ of child rearing (πn) includes the value of goods 
consumed, time absorbed and earnings generated. The time budget is total time 
available (t) to the family or the family decision-makers. This time is distributed 
between producing children (n.tn), improving their ‘quality’ (n.q.tq), working for 
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wages (tw) and consuming and producing other goods and services (z.tz). Subscripts 
here indicate unit time allocations; tn is time absorbed per child in rearing, and tq is 
time spent per child in achieving a given ‘quality’. 
t = n.tn + z.tz + tw + n.q.tq  
The general family budget constraint (S) includes the price of goods consumed 
net of earnings by a child (pn),  the price of each child’s ‘quality’ investment outlays 
(pq) (school and doctors’ fees for instance) and the price of other goods (pz). It also 
includes the time absorbed in each of these activities valued at the opportunity cost, 
the wage rates (w) of those involved. On the other side of the constraint, in addition to 
total possible wage earnings w.t, there is non-wage income v, such as from Poor 
Relief or property.  
S = (pn+w.tn).n +(pz +w.tz)Z + (pq+w.tq)q.n. = w.t + v 
Child ‘price’ and child ‘quality’ (or household investment in human capital) 
are affected by m, the child mortality rate2. Adam Smith (1961 76) assumed that on 
average m = 0.5 in the eighteenth century, so that four births were necessary for a 
completed family size of two children, and this is consistent with reconstitutions on 
survival to age 15 in pre-1750 France and Switzerland (Flinn 1981 Table 6.10). The 
higher the death rate the more time and money must be spent to achieve a target 
family size and child quality. Total family births for target n are b = n/(1- m) ≡ nd.  
Births were limited by later age at marriage; b=b(a); the ‘prudential restraint’ 
mechanism. Given target births, in the absence of other controls age at marriage was 
determined, a=a(b). Consequently, a target family size, coupled with a mortality rate, 
established the age at marriage3.  
Malthus’ model of figure 1 therefore must be modified to take into account the 
dependence of births on deaths in the longer term and target family size4. In addition 
in figure 2 the Malthusian ‘positive check’, whereby death rates depended on wage 
rates, is eliminated. If conditions affecting mortality improved (or, comparing one 
                                                 
2 Mortality itself could depend on w and/or pz.as in the ‘positive check’ of the Malthusian model. At 
low standards of living harvest failures reduces the real wage so that the mortality rises of the more 
vulnerable members of society. Indeed the association of grain prices and mortality has been used to 
infer living standards where they cannot be directly measured (Bengtsson and Dribe 2005). Child 
mortality might also depend on birth rate, with a lower death rate when birth spacing was wider. Child 
mortality to age 15, at issue here, is greater than mortality for parents, the concern of Stark and Wang 
(2005), but they are strongly correlated over time and across countries. 
3 A temporary rise in ‘d’ may allow a subsequent temporary fall in ‘a’ also by opening up a niche in a 
static agricultural economy for another household. 
4 Also the gradient of the births-wage function could change; births may decline, rather than increase, 
as wages rise because of the higher opportunity cost of children. 
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region with a low mortality to a region with a high death rate), for a given target 
family size, birth rates would be lower in due course and the age at marriage would 
eventually be higher. In figure 2, exogenous mortality decline leaves equilibrium 
population unchanged at N* and equilibrium wage is also unaffected. Birth rates 
depend upon mortality as well, because families are interested in surviving children, 
and age at marriage depends upon birth rates. So in the long run a fall in mortality is 
exactly matched in this special case (discussed further below) by a leftwards shift in 
the wage-fertility relation and by a higher marriage age (from a1 to a2). However if 
customary behaviour about marriage does not change quickly, there will be a 
population expansion during the adjustment period, which may be very long. 
Figure 2 A Household Economics Model: post-medieval 
mortality decline, or West versus East Europe, or even 
Europe versus India
wage
Births and 
deaths
Births=b (wage, age at marriage, mortality)
Deaths
Demand 
for labour
N* 
Mortality 
decline
Population 
/labour force
Mortality decline
Age at 
marriage
a1
a2 Mortality decline
 
Also unlike the Malthusian formulation, the household model allows for 
investment in children. Child ‘quality’ (investment in children’s education and health, 
q) may be interpreted in different ways. It might enter the parental preference function 
as the present value of a child’s life-time expected earnings, themselves depending on 
the investment in the child’s education and health. Or the product of numbers of 
children and their utility or consumption may be discounted by the (unobservable) 
rate of parental altruism, determined by the number of children (Becker, Murphy and 
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Tamura 1990). The present model adopts the simplest specification of treating all 
children in a family equally5.  
Historically the European family then is assumed to have maximised 
preferences (U) for children, their ‘quality’ and other goods, subject to fertility (b) and 
general budget constraints (S). They recognised in their constraints that they wanted 
to achieve a number of surviving children. This number was related to (costly) births 
as n=b/d. 
Max U=u(n,q,z) s.t. b=n.d=b(a)  and S, where S is derived as follows; 
 pn. n .d  + pz.Z + pq.q .n.d = w.tw +v  …..cash budget …(1) 
n.d.tn + z.tz + tw + n.d.q.tq = t              …time budget6….(2) 
Depending on how household decisions are made, the optimisation could be 
undertaken by an individual or collectively by both spouses. 
S = (pn+w.tn)(n.d) +(pz +w.tz)Z + (pq+w.tq)q.(n.d) = w.t + v ….general budget…(3) 
Or where πi are generalised or full prices, including the effects of child mortality, 
πn .n + πz. Z + πq.q.n =S 
The constraint; when q=0, gives 
 n = (S -πz. Z)/ πn  
and when n→0, q → ∞.  
 
Child Quality-Quantity Substitution 
Figure 3 shows the limiting ‘no substitution’ case. Lower mortality increases 
child quality as well as child target numbers, by cutting the general ‘price’ of children 
(πn) and boosting real income (raising household utility from U1 to U2).  
The curvature of the constraint, combined with sufficient substitutability in the 
preference function, explains some properties of this model. In response to a ‘child 
price’ fall, ‘quality’ possibly may fall while child numbers increase and age at 
marriage declines. More children, other things being equal, could mean fewer 
resources for investment in each.  
                                                 
5 In some societies there may well be gender differences in investment because money spent 
on male education (pq) could boost lifetime income, whereas the payoff to such spending may be less 
obvious for females.  
 
6 Constant returns to household production are assumed implicitly. In principle, if there were 
economies of scale in family size then tn=t(n), t’>0,t”<0, and conversely for diseconomies of scale. 
Wages are measured in time units, unlike q, z and n, and therefore total time spent in wage work can be 
included in the time budget. By contrast time allocated to the other components depend on the level of 
the activities.  
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Figure 3. Household investment in human capital:  child 
‘quality’ versus numbers- a fall in, or lower, mortality
Child 
‘quality’ q
Target 
number of 
children n
Пn falls
U2U1
 
With a unit elasticity of substitution between child ‘quality’ and ‘numbers’, 
child mortality rate exercises no influence on investment in human capital; the impact 
of raising the full price of ‘child quality’ is exactly offset by the higher full price of 
numbers of children (see Appendix)7. Rentier or Poor Law incomes (v) also do not 
affect investment (the rich are not better educated). However these particular results 
depend critically on an assumed unit elasticity of substitution. With a smaller 
elasticity the income effect of lower child mortality (particularly at high mortality 
rates) dominates substitution away from quality, so that quality goes up as well as 
target family size.  
 
Mortality, Fertility and Family Size 
A fall in child mortality cuts the family cost of a surviving child and therefore boosts 
target family size (n). But the lower death rate itself may require fewer births in total, 
despite an increased n (the elasticity of births to mortality is positive, ebm >0). 
Families may reduce ‘hoarding’ of children in the face of greater certainty of their 
survival8. 
Where enm is the elasticity of target family size with respect to the mortality rate9,  
ebm = enm + m/(1-m)   …(4) 
                                                 
7 This suggests that Chakraborty (2004) conclusions, considering only the quality impact of mortality, 
might be altered with endogenous fertility. 
8 Other more complex models can explain observed fertility-mortality relations- for example Sah 
(1991) and Cigno (1996) - but the present formulation has the advantage of simplicity. 
9 Since b=n/(1-m), 
 ∂b/∂m= (∂n/∂m)(1-m)-1 +  n. (1-m)-2.  
Multiplying through by m/b and substituting for b yields (4) . 
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 Western Europe before 1914 may be described demographically as consisting 
of ‘low pressure’ societies, with low birth rates and low death rates. ‘High pressure’ 
societies by contrast were to be found in Eastern Europe in the same period, with high 
birth rates and high death rates10. Assuming broadly similar enm, equation (4) indicates 
that the mortality rate (m) determined by how much higher in the East were birth rates 
(b). Since enm must be negative, the observed difference between high and low 
pressure societies requires that m/(1-m)>│enm│. For example if enm = -0.2 and m=0.4, 
ebm = 0.47; that is a greater mortality rate is matched by a higher birth rate of almost 
half as much.  One way to generate the special case of Figure 2 has enm = m/(1-m); for 
instance m=0.2 and  enm = -0.25. (Another is the unit elasticity of substitution case of 
the Appendix).. 
Age at marriage is therefore likely to be lower in the ‘high pressure’ society to 
provide these births. When there are more births and each imposes costs on the 
household, the resources available for spending on child quality must fall. Here then 
is a plausible prima facie (non-causal) link between high European age at marriage 
and Western European economic development; lower mortality requires fewer births, 
higher age at marriage and permits greater child quality, which in due course raises 
productivity and innovation. 
A causal link is established when household investment in human capital is 
reinforced by the experience and education of the mother (De Tray 1973). This might 
be expected to determine her children’s education and health in a society where the 
family is the provider of these services (cf. Marshall 1961 469)11. The understanding 
brought to these tasks by a women of  25 or 30 on average must be greater than by 
one of 15. Later age at marriage, after first leaving the parental home to work as a 
servant in early modern Europe, may have offered greater general experience that 
counted as a form of education. By the nineteenth century relatively well paid 
unmarried female factory employment was a possibility in some regions. At the same 
time women educated to a higher level tend to marry latter.  A more educated mother 
                                                 
10 The difference between these types is explained by an elasticity of substitution well below unity. 
This conclusion is reinforced when total mortality is assumed to vary with child mortality, for the 
decline in household time is an income effect that supports the price effects on child numbers and 
quality. On high pressure and low pressure regimes see Wrigley and Schofield  (1989 eg p473). 
11  Children admitted to the Orphan House in Charleston, South Carolina,  from the 1790s to 1840 were 
more likely to be literate if their mothers were literate (Murray 2004). David Mitch (1992 chapter 4) 
finds parental literacy a major cause of adult literacy in Victorian Britain.  
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would have a lower time costs (tq) of investment in her child’s human capital; tq 
=t(a)12. 
Lower time costs of achieving a given child quality reduce the full price of 
quality (πq).  From the general budget constraint,  
∂n/∂q =- πq.n/(πn + πq.q) 
So a lower full price of quality reduces the gradient of the constraint. A given 
reduction in target family size secures a greater increase in quality, while the intercept 
is unchanged (figure 4).  At the same time greater female education also permits a 
higher market wage, and other opportunities. These will raise child full costs πn over a 
lifetime, shifting the intercept downwards in figure 4, and reducing the target number 
of children.  
Fig. 4  Age at marriage and household investment in children: a fall in the time 
costs of child quality 
Child 
‘quality’ q
Target 
number of 
children n U2U1
(S -πz. Z)/ πn
tq falls
 
To summarise, the basic family economics model of a non-causal link between 
Western European marriage pattern and economic development consists of three 
                                                 
12 There is much present day evidence for both relationships. Manda and Meyer (2005) show the 
association between later marriage age and greater education in Malawi. Behrman et al (1999) 
substantiate the higher productivity of more educated women and Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005) find an 
impact of mothers’ age at marriage and education on a measure of child quality in India. Nordblom 
(2004) assumes ‘child quality’ is a function of ‘within the family education’ and parental education, as 
well as state schooling. 
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endogenous variables and three equations. The choice of number of births is 
established by fundamental variables, such as full prices. The fertility equation is then  
b=b(m, V,  pn, pq, pz, w, tn, tq)   …(5) 
The second equation links age at marriage and birth rate,  
a=a (b),            …(6) 
Births cause age at marriage in the sense that a family wanting ‘low’ births must 
choose a ‘high’ female age at first marriage in the Western Europe. Since ‘a’ is one 
means by which ‘b’ and ‘n’ are chosen, those factors that explain ‘b’ and ‘n’ also 
determine ‘a’.13   
The third relationship is the child quality or human capital equation 
q= q(m, V,  pn, pq, pz, w, tn, tq) ….(7) 
The causal link equation joins age at marriage with human capital investment 
tq =f(a) … (7a)  
By substitution of (7a), (7) becomes a quasi-reduced form and includes age at 
marriage as an explanatory variable. 
To link the marriage pattern to European economic development the final 
relationship necessary is one that joins human capital - or ‘child quality’ when the 
child enters the labour force - to the output or growth of the economy as a whole. A 
modern commonplace is that human capital drives economic growth (for example 
Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992 and Galor and Moav 2006). O’Rourke. and Williamson 
(1997) calculated the impact of literacy and school enrolment on European real wage 
convergence or divergence on Britain and the US in this period for individual countries. 
But eastern Europe was not considered and convergence on the leaders is not the same as 
growth; quantification of the present model requires estimating another equation. 
One of the simplest ways for the family model to impact on the economy is through 
an aggregate production function with human capital as an argument Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) for the modern period showed that their reduced form model 
estimate implied a three factor (capital, labour and human capital) Cobb-Douglas 
function with coefficients of one third on each factor. The appropriate specification 
may depend upon the epoch under consideration.  
                                                 
13 The concern here is with long term relationships. Cycles in economic activity also generate 
temporary changes in nuptiality, affecting the age at marriage. These short run changes, perhaps 
reflecting shifts in timing rather than in fundamentals, were sufficiently marked that marriage rates 
have been employed as an index of industrial fluctuations (e.g. Lewis 1978).  
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. The full model developed here  provides an explanation for the coincidence 
of the marriage pattern and European economic development, with a lower ‘m’, 
mortality, in western Europe reducing ‘b’, birth rates, and directly raising ‘q’, child 
quality. The lower birth rate requires a higher age at marriage, ‘a’. Greater child 
quality, more investment in human capital, raises output, without being causally 
linked to the higher marriage age.  
A causal connection is created when a longer term consequence of a higher 
marriage age is a fall in tq., an improvement in the efficiency of household investment 
in child quality. This increases investment in children. When they grow up and begin 
work, their productivity and the output of the economy is higher than if mortality had 
never fallen and the position of women never changed with the higher marriage age. 
The next step is to establish whether the evidence supports this account. 
 
2. Measurement and Data 
Series on death rates sufficiently long to cover the onset of the European 
marriage pattern would be desirable but are unattainable. The available evidence 
nonetheless does suggest that life was short in the late medieval period, which 
culminated in a series of devastating fourteenth century plagues. Two studies of late 
medieval monasteries provide indications of sustained high mortality rates in England 
((Hatcher 1986; Bailey 1996). In the Durham area, tenant numbers imply that 
population fell to 45 percent of pre-Black Deaths by the end of fourteenth century, 
and tithe evidence indicates a similar collapse of output (Dodds 2004).  
Because of the favourable population-resource balance, survivors in the 
fifteenth century experienced high wages and living standards. Apparently in many 
countries this level of real wages was not attained for another three or four centuries 
(Allen 2001, Van Zanden 1999). Lower real wages stemmed from population and 
labour force growth exceeding expansion in the demand for labour.  
The likelihood then is that population growth was triggered by mortality 
decline in Western Europe over the 15th and 16th centuries compared with earlier 
years, probably largely brought about by quarantine regulations (Slack 1981). 
Venice’s quarantine measures reduced plague frequency by the 16th century and 
eliminated plague after 1630 completely (De Seguy Dupeyron 1834 12). Since the 
marriage pattern becomes apparent by the sixteenth century, the readily available 
statistics confirm that mortality first fell and then the late age at marriage emerged 
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when population recovery was threatening high living standards- consistent with the 
proposed model. 
By the seventeenth century, economic vitality in Europe was focussed in the 
extreme North Western corner of the continent, before the Atlantic trade could have 
made a substantial contribution (Israel 1989 p5). Technical superiority of Dutch 
craftsmen, and of Dutch shipbuilding techniques and ship owning, can plausibly be 
related to Dutch human capital. Wages, also reflecting skill and productivity, were 
moderately dynamic in Antwerp, Amsterdam and London from the sixteenth century. 
But in most other major cities of Europe real wages collapsed between 1500 and 1750 
(Allen 2001).  
Many elements combine to explain the fortunes of individual economies. It is 
most unlikely that a single source of human capital accumulation was sufficient to 
explain the pattern of European economic development over three or more centuries. 
In any case the data over this period is not available to evaluate any link across the 
whole of Europe. Instead the proposition to be tested and quantified here is that, when 
a wide range of data becomes available in the nineteenth century, a causal connection 
existed between the European marriage age and the level of European incomes.  
With increasing pervasiveness of the state in the nineteenth century, public 
provision began to substitute for that of the family; the marriage pattern started to fade 
both for this reason and because of diffusion of other means of family limitation.  
Were richer data sets available for earlier periods, later family evolution suggests that 
relations of the model might be even more apparent then.   
As it is the model is tested on two data sets; one cross-national and the other 
within one country, nineteenth century England. An unbalanced panel of countries for 
Europe, including Russia, at decadal intervals for 1870-191014 is employed. Because 
forty years is a short time to allow variation in the phenomenon of interest, even when 
there is some panel data, a single cross-section is analysed first. It is important to 
include (data-scarce) eastern Europe in the data set both for comparison with Western 
Europe and to avoid sample selection bias. A cost is that some measures are only 
available or can be constructed for selected years15.  
                                                 
14 Constructed from Mitchell (1975) and data in Foreman-Peck and Lains (2000). This last focussed 
especially on economies of South East Europe, of particular concern for comparison with North West 
Europe in the present study. 
15 The use of decadal intervals over forty years largely averages out the possibility that economies in 
the sample may have been at different stages in their business cycle in the observation years. The data 
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3. Fertility and Death Rates.  
Across Europe and within England in the later nineteenth century, lower death rates 
were associated with lower fertility, when controlling for other influences and 
allowing for possible feedbacks. This is consistent with (but not essential for) Western 
European low birth rates being triggered by the ending of an earlier high mortality 
regime.  
In the birth rate equation (5) estimated in Table 1, for English counties in 1861 
infant mortality (‘inf. m.’, ranging from 121 to 174 per 1000 live births) is a positive 
and significant determinant of fertility. The OLS coefficients of equations 2 and 3 of 
Table 1 imply that a fall of 50 reduced the birth rate per 1000 persons by just under 2.  
 Table 1 Crude Birth Rate 1861 English Counties 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
 
inf.m. 0.59  0.040  0.040  0.217  0.187 
 (3.01)** (3.10)** (3.10)** (2.51)* (6.08)** 
f1860   -0.193 0.260  -0.016  
   (0.79) (4.61)** (0.13)  
Deps -0.0125   -0.012       
 (1.42)   (1.42)       
manuf 0.125    0.025   
 (3.61)**   (0.61)   
m1860   -0.116 -0.105 -0.087  
   (3.28)** (2.11)* (1.24)  
Const 24.27  26.298 27.24  6.438  7.635 
 (9.46) (14.62)** (12.70)** (0.75) (1.85) 
girls   -0.063 -0.055   
   (2.17)* (1.82)   
 
Obs 39  39  39  39  39   
R-sq 0.63  0.76  0.78  (0.04)      (0.21) 
 
Est OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Eq. 4.Instrumented: infantmortality1861.Instruments:f1860 m1860 manuf marriageage1861.Firststage F-
stat= 10.40 
Eq. 5.Instrumented: infantmortality1861.Instruments:manuf marriageage1861 f1860.First stage F-stat 
=14.25 
Excluding Yorkshire and London Including Monmouth. Variable key in Appendix 
 
 
Allowing for the possibility that mortality is endogenous increases the impact by a 
factor of five (the birth rate ranged from 30 to 40). The wealth measure, savings 
deposits (‘deps’), is negative related to births but is not significant at the 10 percent 
                                                                                                                                            
set is restricted to Europe because New World countries were not subject to the same land scarcity as 
Europe- or in some respects the same traditions- and Asian series on comparable bases are usually 
unavailable (and marriage concepts may differ.)  
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level. Gender differences in human capital effects (as measured by literacy) are very 
significant in the OLS equations. Male earning power and a positive male wage 
elasticity of births are reflected in the negative coefficient on male illiteracy (‘m1860’ 
Table 1). The biggest effect is from female human capital, that measuring the time 
cost of children (w.tn), female illiteracy (‘f1860’, ranging from 18 to 54 percent), 
where the 36 percent variation accounts for 7 births per 1000. Availability of 
manufacturing employment (‘manuf’) ceases to be a significant influence on births 
once the human capital variables are included in the model. Proportion of girls not 
attending school ten years earlier negatively impacts on fertility – perhaps because 
school attendance reflects lack of employment opportunities. 
Across Europe the range of fertility and mortality variation was considerably 
greater than within England; Russian crude death rates were double those of Denmark 
and Norway, though all fell over the period analysed. The 1870-1910 panel therefore 
provides more information than a single cross-section16.  
As with the county data, death rate is a significant determinant of births 
(Table 2), with larger coefficients (‘death’) estimated in equations (5 and 6) assuming 
death rate is endogenous. The death rate coefficient of 0.54 (equation 2 Table 2) 
indicates that a  one standard deviation cut in the death rate (5.4) reduces the birth rate 
by almost 3, or about 10 percent. At the sample mean, the implied elasticity is 0.39. 
The average crude death rate for the sample is 23, for which the Coale/Demeny model 
South yields 67 percent surviving to age 15 17. For a completed family size of two, 
three births were necessary on average. Recall equation (4) that ebm= (m/(1-m))+ enm. 
Then at the mean of the sample enm = 0.39- (0.33/0.67) = -0.1. Target family size rises 
by one tenth of a fall in the mortality rate.  
  The negative GNP per capita elasticity (’gnppc’) of births combines the effects of 
both unearned income (V) and earnings (w) from (3). Since the V elasticity must be 
positive, the implied wage elasticity must be strongly negative to outweigh the unearned 
income (V) effect. This implies that on average across Europe 1870-1910 the time cost of 
children generated a substitution effect greater than the pure income effect. According to 
the GNP coefficient (‘gnppc’) of equation (1) Table 2, one standard deviation of GNP per 
head (573) lowers birth rate by (573*.0084=) 4.8.  
                                                 
16 General mortality is used as a proxy for mortality in the 0-15 age group. The crude death rate is used 
in the European data 
17 And  infant mortality of  0.17 with a population increase of 1.04%.  Model North yields 1- m=0.69. 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/pas.html. 
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Table 2 Crude Birth Rate in Europe 1870-1914: Panel Regressions 
         (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)   
  
death   0.399 0.537  0.464  0.436  0.681    0.581 
 (3.52)** (5.50)** (4.37)** (3.43)** (8.88)** (2.69)** 
gnppc -0.0084     -0.003          -0.005 
 (3.55)**     (1.81)    (2.07)* 
illit 0.103  0.056  -0.002  -0.037  
 (1.76)  (2.04)* (0.03)  (0.78)  
year 1.475  0.163  -0.262      0.836  
 (2.77)** (0.68)  (0.74)      (2.22)* 
agrilab      3.246  
       (0.55)  
Const 26.88  18.372  23.095  26.677  17.251  24.24 
 (6.29)** (6.42)** (5.68)** (4.17)**     (10.12)*     (3.19)** 
 
R2with 0.679  0.5254         0.5361 0.6381        0.5977        0.6522 
Betwn 0.4662  0.5607         0.4459 0.4765        0.5092        0.5625 
Overl 0.4162  0.5234         0.4383 0.4233        0.4900        0.5112 
 
Obs   78  83  83  74  78  78 
 
Estim  FE  RE  FE  FE  IV FE  IV FE 
    
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Eqn. 5 Instrumented:   deathr;  Instruments:  year illitfin gnppc standard area pop. First stage F-stat=24.95. Eqn. 6 Instrumented: deathr; 
Instruments: year  standard area pop illitfin kl density. First stage F-stat= 23.05 
 
 Population growth was shifting a higher proportion into the reproductive age 
group. The trend rise in crude birth rates (‘year’ equation 1 Table 2 ) of 1.47 every 
decade, took place around a sample average of 32 . Equation (4) Table 2 shows that a 
lower proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture (‘agrilab’) is associated with 
a lower birth rate but not significantly so.  
 
4. European  Age at Marriage and Fertility 
As late as 1900, to the west of an invisible boundary from Trieste to the Baltic the 
great majority of women aged 20-24 were single whereas to the east, most were 
married. Only 11 percent of Bulgarian women aged 20-29 were unmarried or 
widowed, compared with 45 percent in Britain half a century earlier (Hajnal 1965 136 
119). The mean age at first marriage of Serbian women between 1896 and 1900 was 
19.8 compared with 26.7 in Sweden (Webb 1911 395). In nineteenth century western 
Europe the percentage of those married among women aged 15 and over was below 
55 and usually less than 50. For Serbia and Bulgaria, the 1900 censuses recorded 69 
percent, and for Romania, 65. 
The model’s postulated relationship, a=a(b) (equation 6), still apparently held  
despite alternative methods of fertility control (Crafts 1989) (Table  3 and figure 5). 
France is an outlier below the regression line in figure 3, thanks to the redistribution 
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of property during the Revolution that encouraged lower birth rates. Eastern Europe’s 
high birth rate is very apparent in the left cluster. In particular the outlier above the 
line and to the left, Russia, probably owes its position to the quarter century lag in 
measuring proportion of women single. The true proportion in 1900 was very likely 
lower, closer to the Serbian percentage, which would improve the fit of the regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 European Fertility and Proportion of Women Single c 1900 
 Birth rate Percentage 
women 
aged 20-24 
single 
Percentage 
women age 
25-29 
single 
Austria 35.0  66 38 
Hungary 39.4  36 15 
 Belgium 28.9  71 41 
 Bulgaria 42.3  24 3 
 Denmark 29.7  75 42 
 Finland 32.6  68 40 
 France 21.3  58 30 
Germany 35.6  71 34 
 Italy 33.0  60 30 
Netherlands 31.6  79 44 
Norway 29.7  77 48 
Portugal 30.5  69 41 
Romania 38.8  20 8 
Russia 49.3  *28 *9 
Serbia 42.4  16 2 
Spain 33.9  55 26 
Sweden 27.0  80 52 
Switzerland 28.6  78 45 
Great Britain 28.7  73 42 
  
Source: Hajnal 1965;  Mitchell 1975 
Notes * USSR 1926 
Fig. 5 European fertility and age at marriage c 1900
y = -0.3294x + 43.823
R 2  = 0.6413
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 
60.0 
0 20 40 60
percentage women aged 25-29 single
birth rate 
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 Within countries a pattern similar to that across Europe, though less 
varied, can be found. In English counties age at first marriage of women born between 
1826 and 1841, and married between 1841 and 1861, ranged from 25.8 to 23.0 (Crafts 
1978)18. As the model predicts, the (target) birth rate is highly correlated with age at 
marriage; half the variance of mean marriage age in 1861 is explained simply by the 
1861 crude birth rate (‘birth61x’ varying between 30.2 and 40.3 per 1000 population, 
equation 4 Table 4). Equation 1 table 4 has a coefficient on birth rates similar to that 
in the bivariate cross-European relationship (figure 5). Instrumental variable 
estimation allows for the possibility that birth rate or literacy respond to age at 
marriage as well as age at marriage being chosen with target births in mind.   
 
          Table 4.  Mean Age at First Marriage for Women 1861;  
English County Regressions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
birth61x  -0.340  -0.416  -0.152  -0.188 
  (8.02)**  (2.71)**  (2.05)*  (4.90)** 
Inf.mort.     -0.004  -0.0002  
      (0.41)  (0.03)  
m1860  -0.042  -0.051 
  (3.00)**  (2.51)* 
f1860  0.069  0.086 
  (3.76)**  (2.59)* 
depos  0.002  0.002 
  (1.26)  (0.56) 
manuf  -0.003  0.0005 
  (0.29)  (0.04) 
Obs  39  39  39  39 
 
R-squared 0.70  0.67  0.50  0.51 
  OLS  IV  IV  OLS 
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
Eqn 2 Instrumented:  birth61x, Instruments: m1860 f1860 manuf depositsinsavingsbanks infantmortality1861 first 
stage F stat 22.4 
Eq 3 Instrumented:  birth61x , Instruments:   infantmortality1861 depositsinsavingsbanks manuf first stage F 
stat=20.2 
 
 Once birth rate is included in the model, infant mortality (‘inf. mort.’) ceases 
to contribute, in accordance with the theory of equation (6) (Table 4 equations 3 and 
4). Age at marriage is established by target family size and the mortality rate that 
determine the number of births necessary to achieve the objective; the birth rate 
covers both. Equation 4 Table 4 implies that a fall in the crude birth rate by 10 per 
                                                 
18 The estimates are derived from the proportions of women ever married in various age ranges. Crafts 
finds weak negative correlations between age at marriage on the one hand and urbanization and infant 
mortality on the other. 
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thousand required an increase in the age of marriage of 1.9 years.   Male and female 
illiteracy (‘m1860’,‘f1860’) are statistically significant influences on county marriage 
age (Equation 1 Table 4). But manufacturing employment (‘manuf’) (in 1851) is not 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
5. Child Quality and Age at Marriage 
The key relationship to be tested is that age at marriage is linked to the ‘full 
price’ of child quality. Evidence on this third fundamental equation (7), with (7a) 
substituted in, is provided by taking later literacy as a measure of child quality. A 
higher marriage age in this context means the possibility of more, and more effective, 
investment in child quality. Mortality also may affect the full price of quality. Finally 
households may, or may be obliged to, choose to buy schooling which will have an 
effect on child quality. 
All poor, European periphery countries were highly illiterate in 1900, with 
rates around 70 percent (Flora 1972). In Western Europe the index was usually well 
under 20. Young Serbian or Bulgarian women could very rarely read and write in the 
1890s. Only 65 and 123 respectively in every thousand who married could do so 
(Webb 1911 304), less than the proportion in East Anglia of the mid-seventeenth 
century (Cressy 1977). In England and Wales of the 1890s, 940 per 1000 were able to 
write, and even the figure for primarily agricultural Ireland was 824.  
Within southern European countries there was a similar, if less extreme, 
pattern to that of Europe as a whole. In Spain, the highest ages at marriage for females 
in 1887 and male literacy rates in 1910 were found in Madrid and Asturias, only 
exceeded by Old Castile. Conversely, Andalusia and Levante (Valencia and Murcia) 
showed the lowest regional age at marriage and literacy (the correlation coefficient 
over 12 regions is +0.73) (Nunez 1990; Rowland 1988).  
The range of variation in Italy was greater than in Spain. In 1861 the lowest 
age of female marriage was in Catania, Sicily, at 20.4 years and the highest was 26.3 
in Teramo, Abruzzo (Rettarolli 1992). Sicily’s illiteracy was among the highest Italian 
regional rates at 81.18 % in 1881 for those over 6 years of age, compared with 
32.27% in Piedmont (Censimento 1883).  
In addition to investing their time, households could spend money on ‘child 
quality’ and those that did not may have taken advantage of state provision of 
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education in the later nineteenth century19. Also the efficiency of household 
production would affect willingness to allow children to attend formal education 
outside the home, as well as the permitted duration of schooling- which could be 
short. As late as 1906 children in some Italian communes ceased formal education at 
9 years old, after only three years (Webb 1911 220).  
 
Table 5 European Marriage, Schooling and Illiteracy 1890-10 
 % of  women aged 
25-29 single  
around 1900 
Primary school 
children c.1890 % 
of pop 
% Illiteracy 
1910 (Flora)
Austria-Hungary 27 12.6 17 
Belgium 41 10.1 13.4 
Bulgaria 3 5.9 62.2 
Denmark 42 15.4 3.0 
Finland 40 2.3 1.1 [45]** 
France 30 14.7 11.9 
Germany 34 15.9 3.0 
Greece 13 7.8 59.7 
Italy 30 8.1 39.3 
Netherl’ds 44 14.2 7.5 
Norway 48 14.3 3.0 
Portugal 41 4.7 68.9 
Romania 8 3.2 65.0 
Russia 9 2 55.0 
Serbia 2 3.0 77.5 
Spain 26 10.5 52.2 
Sweden 52 15.1 1.5 
Switzerl’d 45 16.0 1.5 
Great Britain 42 13.0 7.5 
Source Hajnal  1965 Tables 2 and 3: Mitchell 1975; Flora 1975. Notes: Single women in Austria and Hungary are 
aggregated.  * per 1000 of under 15 age group. ** see discussion in text.  
The continuing importance of informal education for human capital 
investment is suggested by failure of schooling 20 years earlier to be a unique guide 
to literacy ranking around the beginning of the twentieth century in Europe (Table 5). 
France schooled more intensively than Britain but experienced higher illiteracy. 
Similarly for Austria-Hungary compared with Belgium. Finland is an extreme case, 
                                                 
19 In north western Europe the widespread ability to read was clearly related to religion. From 1686 
every adult citizen in Sweden was required to be able to read the central texts of the Lutheran 
Catechism. From 1726 by law households were regularly examined and the results noted in a register. 
The male head of household was responsible for performance (Petterson 1999). But beliefs can only be 
observed indirectly, by their effects. French Catholicism differed sufficiently from the Catholicism of 
southern or eastern Europe to render questionable placing them in the same religious category for 
purposes of explaining and predicting behaviour. Hungary did not show the European marriage pattern 
in the later eighteenth century but (in 1949) the majority of the population were Roman Catholic, as in 
many countries that did. As far as primary schooling, which might be linked to literacy, is concerned. 
Peter Lindert (2004 p103) concludes ‘‘history is ambivalent about the role of religion in the overall 
supply of primary schooling``. 
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partly because the Flora illiteracy index of 1.1% refers to the ability to read only. 
Among those over 14 only 55.3% could both read and write in 1910 (Hjerpe, 
Miettinen and Vesalainen 1999). Even with this adjustment Finland appears more 
literate than Greece or Portugal, both of which enrolled much higher proportions of 
their populations in primary school. 
60 percent of European inter-country variation in illiteracy in 1910 is 
explained by the proportion of women single aged 25-29, when the Finnish datum is 
adjusted. Adding in the proportion of the primary age school population attending 
school twenty years earlier raises the explained variance to 87 percent for the adjusted 
data, and both coefficients are statistically significant (equation (1) Table 6). 
 Although the dates of the presumed explanatory variables of Table 6 precede 
those of the dependent, illiteracy, variable, possibly persistence in the data might lead 
to a correlation even if true causation runs from illiteracy to proportion married or age 
at marriage.  Instrumental variables estimation for the proportion married was 
therefore also tried (equation (2) Table 6).  Controlling for possible two-way 
causation and for schooling, proportion of women aged 25-29 single (and therefore 
age at marriage) is a statistically significant influence upon cross-national variations 
in literacy. The coefficient of ‘proportion of women single’ in the IV equation (2) 
implies that a change of one standard deviation of this proportion (16) changes 
illiteracy by considerably more than does one standard deviation (5) of schooling. . 
 
Table 6. Illiteracy regressions Europe 1910 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  
  
propnsingle  -0.556  -1.425  -1.347 
   (2.08)*  (3.60)**  (7.94)** 
schooling  -3.730  -2.110  
   (4.07)**  (1.64)  
Constant  85.165  96.129  72.128 
   (14.37)** (7.59)**  (18.00)** 
Observations  19  18  19 
R-squared  0.87  0.71  0.60 
                      OLS                  IV  OLS 
Notes Robust t statistics in parentheses; significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Eqn (2) Instrumented:  propnsingle, Instruments:  schooling agrilab first stage  F-stat=9.34  
  
 
The ‘within country’ data set offers another opportunity to test and quantify 
the human capital equation. For the child quality investment, illiteracy in 1885 is 
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estimated as a function of earlier school attendance, mortality and age at marriage 
(Table 7).  
Table 7 Illiteracy in English Counties 1885 
 
 Age at 
Marriage 1861 
Boys not at 
school 1851 
Girls not at 
School 1851 
Mortality R2 N Estimation method 
(i) -1.78 
[3.09] 
 
 
 
0.30 
[3.03] 
 
0.17 
[2.24] 
- 0.67 42 OLS 
 
(ii) -3.14 
[-3.41 
0..29 
[3.38] 
0.17 
[2.64] 
-0.001 
[0.04] 
0.62 
(pseudo) 
42 IVs deposits, manuf, girlsnot, 
    boynotat,infantmo . First 
stage F=10.49 
(iii) -3.09 
[-5..34] 
-0.30 
[-3.26] 
-0.17 
[2.55] 
- 0.62  
(pseudo) 
42 IVs deposits,  girlsnot, boysnot 
    Birth rate ,infantmo . First 
stage F=12.26 
 
Notes: London excluded. Monmouth and extra metropolitan Kent, Surrey and Middlesex included. t 
ratios in parentheses.  
 
Table 7 shows that counties with a higher age at marriage in 1861 are less 
illiterate in 1885, controlling for school attendance 30 years earlier. Marriage age here 
reflects the ‘full price’ of quality, female efficiency in home education, tq=f(a). A one 
year higher age at marriage cuts illiteracy in 1885, with a mean of 11.8 percent, by a 
substantial 3.09 percent (equation iii). Infant mortality has the expected sign but in the 
IV estimation is not significant at the 10 percent level.   
From both the English county and the European national data the evidence is 
that age at marriage as an influence on children’s home background, as well as 
schooling, is necessary to explain literacy (a proxy for wider child quality and human 
capital). 
 
6. The Contribution of Human Capital  
The final component of the present interpretation is that human capital played 
a vital role in European economic development over the period 1870-1910.   
Economic development typically was more sedate in the nineteenth century than after 
1950. The dynamic sectors were manufacturing, mining and infrastructure, largely 
powered by coal-based steam technology. Traditional agriculture was often protected 
against foreign competition to slow migration into rapidly growing towns and 
industries. The pace at which resources switched out of agriculture was therefore both 
a measure of technical progress in those industries and in the economy as a whole. A 
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directly estimated historical production function will shift at a rate dependent on 
urbanization (for instance Allen 2003), or on the closely related migration of labour 
out of agriculture (Williamson 1991).   
The constant returns to scale, aggregate production function of the present 
model is:  
Y/L= B A -λ (K/L)η (H/L) θ …(8)    
where Y is aggregate output, K is physical capital, L is labour, H is human 
capital and A is agricultural employment share. Assuming the labour force is 
proportional to the population, P (because of data deficiencies), (8) may be divided 
through by population to create the equation below, estimated in Table 8.  
Ln(Y/P)=B +η ln(K/P) +θ ln(H/P) +λ ln (μP/A) 
where μ is the labour force participation rate and μ P/A is the reciprocal of the 
labour force employed in agriculture. 
To measure physical capital across European economies the empirical model 
focuses upon infrastructure because it was so capital-intensive. In particular railways 
transformed the capital requirements of European economies in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and therefore railway length is employed as the capital proxy. 
Human capital is measured by the literacy rate. In contrast to the commonly used 
schooling variable, literacy has the merit of being a direct measure of human capital 
rather than an input to human capital production (Hanushek and Kimko 2000). 
In the instrumental variables estimates of the production function of table 8, 
equation (ii), the human capital coefficient is large and significant (θ≈0.4 in equation 
ii) compared with physical capital (η≈0.2 in ii), (which implies that the coefficient on 
‘raw’ labour is 0.4). Both equations were (Hausman) tested against their fixed effect 
equivalent. Differences in the coefficients were not systematic and therefore the more 
efficient random effect models were preferred. 
What effect does this relationship imply for later marriage? From the cross- 
European relation and the coefficient of equation (3) table 6, the difference between 
Great Britain and Russia in women aged 25-9 unmarried of (42-9=) 33 percentage 
points created a difference of (1.35*33=) 44 percent points in illiteracy - about two 
thirds of the total gap in 1900. Raising literacy by this much would have boosted 
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Russian GNP per head by 36 percent, to about the level achieved by Austria-Hungary 
a decade earlier20. 
 
Table 8 Production Function Random Effects Panel Regressions: 
 Europe 1870-1910 
Dependent variable log GNP per head 
 Log Human 
capital (% 
literacy) 
Log 
Capital 
(rail km 
per 
head) 
Resources in 
agriculture 
R2   
within 
between 
overall 
N Estimation 
(i) 0.208 
[2.85] 
0.073 
[2.51] 
-1.403 
[-7.19] 
0.615 
0.924 
0.871 
75 Panel Random Effects  
(ii) 0.397 
[2.36] 
0.193 
[2.30] 
-0.772 
[-2.10] 
0.542  
0.859 
0.775 
71 Panel IV Random, human capital and capital 
endogenous, agrilab, average tariff, year, 
deathrate, log population. First stage  F-stat 
16.3 and 15.8 for human and physical 
capital respectively (FE) 
Note: t  ratios in parentheses 
 
Within England a higher level of economic development meant that the impact 
of marriage age and literacy, as well as the dispersion of these variables, was lower 
than across Europe. The difference between the maximum and minimum ages was 
only 2.8 years. Had a gap in marriage age by county as great as five years been 
observed, the regression model of equation 3 Table 7 implies that this would have 
been associated with more than a (3.09*5≈)15 percentage point difference in 
illiteracy. Literacy ranged from 78 to 96 percent. Adding the 15 percentage points on 
to the least literate county would have raised output by 7 percent, according to the 
cross-European production function.21. 
The parameter estimates of Table 8 then imply that human capital as measured 
by literacy played a substantial role in European economic development 1870-1910, 
at a time when the gap between western and eastern Europe was widening. Coupled 
with other evidence presented, they also indicate that the unusual marriage pattern of 
western Europe contributed significantly to this growth. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In a longer term perspective, the likelihood is that declines in mortality in western 
Europe from the 15th and 16th centuries required measures to control births, if living 
                                                 
20[ Ln(74)-Ln(30)]*0.4 
21 Using the same equation of table 8, (ln(93)-ln(78))*0.4=0.07.  
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standards were not to fall precipitously. The late female age at first marriage was one 
response. Fortuitously, a smaller number of births created more opportunity for 
investment in child quality. Up to this point the association of the marriage pattern 
and higher living standards is explained – at least qualitatively- without a direct causal 
connection.  
To the extent that later marriage created more opportunities for women outside 
child bearing and rearing, a causal link can appear. As women were the principal 
eventual socialisers of the next generation, their wider experience was likely to be 
transmitted in more efficient and greater learning, broadly interpreted. At some stages 
in history literacy would be a proxy for such education.  
Although a lower death rate reduced the ‘full price’ of a child, the increase in 
target completed family size was small compared with the reduction in births 
necessary to achieve it. This was ensured by the high levels of mortality in medieval 
Europe and in Eastern Europe through to the early twentieth century.    
Three equations of human capital supply by the family provide the core of the 
explanatory model. The first is that deaths determine target births, but other variables 
also matter, such as earnings, efficiency and opportunity costs. Target births then 
determine age at marriage in the second equation. Human capital or child quality is 
explained in the third equation. The critical variable in this last relationship is age at 
marriage, here an index of family efficiency, independent of schooling. Finally human 
capital as measured by literacy is utilised in the production relationship, and impacts 
upon output. It turns out to do so more substantially in Eastern than in Western 
Europe. 
Nineteenth century Europe showed striking demographic and economic 
associations. Lower female age at first marriage was linked with higher fertility and 
lower literacy. At the same time literacy was positively associated with productivity 
and output. These relations analysed in the present paper suggest that Eastern Europe 
was poorer than Western Europe because of lower human capital. In turn inferior 
human capital endowments were rooted in customs whereby women married younger 
and were uneducated in the widest sense. 
Systematic evidence for relationships lasting four centuries is less easy to 
accumulate than for later nineteenth century European economic development. So it is 
reassuring to find that on the eastern side of the marriage age divide during the later 
nineteenth century, in Asia Minor, some had reached similar conclusions about the 
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means and the consequences of long-run transmission and accumulation of human 
capital as proposed in this paper. A British traveller reported the following discussion;  
‘Hundreds of years ago our women knew quite as much as Frank22 women’ observed 
my host.  
‘Yes’ replied his companion ’And then we could hold our own against the Franks. 
But the Frank women have been educated since those times….’ (Burnaby 1877). 
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Appendix A . Household human capital model  
The effect on quality-quantity substitution of unit elasticities of substitution on the 
preference function in the household model can be shown as follows. 
Suppose U=nα q β z γ 
then the demand for children is 
n = ((α-β)/(α+γ))  [V+wt] / [(pn +wtn).d]   …(1) 
If β>α, the utility elasticity of child quality is greater than that for numbers of 
children, therefore there are no children demanded and no marriage is necessary. 
Hereafter assume α>β. Lower child mortality (reducing d) raises target family size (by 
cutting the ‘price’ of a surviving child) with unit elasticity. Lower child earnings - 
from say legislation requiring school attendance - raises pn and therefore reduces 
target family size.  
. The ‘child quality’ equation, with the above unit substitution elasticity 
preference function, is: 
q={β/(α-β)](πn/πq) = [β /(α-β)](pn +wtn)/ (pq +wtq) …(2) 
 q is fixed solely by relative prices and income effects are irrelevant. Therefore when 
pn rises, n falls and a (age at marriage) increases, q must go up. 
Substituting b (=n/d) for n in (1) shows that, with the unit substitution 
elasticity, there is no relation between fertility and child mortality. 
b = [(α-β)/(α+γ)] (V + wt))/ (pn + w tn)  ….(3) 
 The effect on births of the increase in the target n exactly counter-balances the impact 
of the lower mortality and so total births or fertility- and therefore age at marriage- 
remain unchanged (the elasticity of births with respect to mortality, ebm = 0).  
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A smaller elasticity of substitution changes the response. 
 
Appendix B: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
English County Data 
Percentage of brides and grooms illiterate 1885 (ILLIT188), Percentage Boys not at 
school 1951, (BOYSNOTA), Percentage girls not at school 1851 (GIRLSNOT), Boys 
aged 5-9 occupied 1851 (BOYSOCCU), Boys aged 10-14 occupied 1851 
(BOYSOCC1), number of domestic staff per 1000 of population 1841  (DOMESTIC), 
Males aged twenty and over engaged in agriculture 1851 % ) (MANUF), Percentages 
of illiterate grooms 1860 (M1860), Percentages of illiterate brides 1860 (F1860), 
Deposits in savings banks 1844 percentage above or below average (DEPOSITS); 
Stephens (1987) 
Infant mortality 1860 (INFANTMO) Lee (1991)  
Mean age at first marriage for women 1860 (AGEMARRI) Crafts (1978) 
Crude birth rate 1861 (BIRTH61) Hechter, M., U.K. County Data, 1851-1966 
[computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1976. SN: 430.  
 
Europe Panel 
From Foreman-Peck and Lains (2000) and Mitchell (1975). 
GNP per capita in constant prices- 1980 international dollars (GNPPC)  , Population 
in 000 (POP), Tariff revenue/import value (AVTARIF), Illiteracy (ILLIT) 
(LH=log(100-ILLIT), Crude birth rate per 1000 (BIRTHR), Crude death rate per 1000 
(DEATHR), Length of railway line (RAILKM) (LK=log(RAILKM/POP), % of 
labour force employed in agriculture (AGRILAB), Metallic standard adherence 
(DUMSTAN). 
